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Federal Transfers and Tax Efforts
of the States in India
M. Naganathan
K. Jothi Sivagnanam
Introduction
The federal grants create some fiscal effects on the budgets
of the unit government. Though different types of grants create
different effects, all grants in general increase the fiscal resources
available to the unit government to finance public services or to
lower their tax/revenue effort. Hence, the federal  resource transfer
policy in any multi-tier Government needs to be designed to
strengthen the resource position of the sub-central units. The extent
of own effort of a sub-central unit   in meeting their expenditure
requirements or the tax effort criterion must play a significant role
in this regard. Theories on fiscal federalism argues that expenditure
assignment must proceed tax assignment1.  ‘This is because tax
assignment would in general be guided by expenditure
requirements and these can’t be worked out in advance of
expenditure assignment. However in India tax assignment was
undertaken independently of expenditure assignment2.
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Moreover the basic framework of tax and expenditure
assignment is based on the government of India Act 1935 which
becomes irresponsive to meet the changing developmental needs
of the States and suffer from relative inadequacy, inelasticity,
stickiness and  lack  of  buoyancy. The 1935 Act was designed to
cater to the requirements of administrative consolidation than of
developmental acceleration. Economic and Social Planning
inaugurated in 1950 to accelerate the growth process in India. All
the expanding developmental functions were assigned to the States.
Different strategies have been followed   during the plan era. Then
liberalisation policy has been proposed and implemented since
1991. However, the Indian federal system assumes a fairly rigid
bifurcation of power and     resources      between    the    Union   and
States  curbing  any  flexibility to meet the changing requirements.
Under such rigid  institutional arrangement, there are three types
of  Union  resource transfers to States, mainly to correct vertical
and horizontal imbalances via.,  Finace Commission3,  Planning
Commission4 and discretionary transfers5 through various Union
Ministries and agencies. While recommending the resource
transfers from the Union to States, the statutory as well as non-
statutory bodies like Finance Commission and Planning
All the Finance Commissions have laid    emphasis on the
tax efforts of the States. Fifth Finance Commission went to the extent
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 of measuring tax effort for devolution purpose and the Sixth Finance
Commission went against the use of it and the rest showed their
sincerity somewhere in between these two extremes.
The objective of this study is to highlight the impact of Union
resource transfers on the tax effort of the States. The relationship
between Union transfers and tax efforts of the States are interlinked
in the sense that the transfer policies may encourage or discourage
the tax efforts of the States.
This linkage can be in three ways. First, Union transfers may
substitute the relative tax efforts of the States in relation to their tax
potential, that is, the States are likely to impart fiscal imprudence in
anticipation of assured share from the Union government. In other
words, the Union transfers may dampen the tax efforts of the States
because taxing the local people is politically unattractive. Hence,
instead of tapping the excess tax potential, the State may substitute
Union transfer to meet their expenditure needs. Secondly, Union
transfers may directly encourage the tax efforts or it may encourage
tax potential and hence tax efforts of the States. Thirdly, the effect
may be neutral.
Union resource transfers recommended by Finance
Commission are expected to play a positive role to offset the fiscal
256
disadvantages in the provision of public services. In this
context, the transfer policy will have to be applied with utmost
caution without sacrificing the fiscal responsibility of the States. It
is argued that the States in India incur more unproductive
expenditure and not effectively enhancing the tax base because
of the resource transfers from the Union government.
Countries like India, where resources are scarce,
mobilisation of additional resources especially by exploiting the
surplus tax potential in order to finance economic development and
to shoulder the tax burden equally among the States deserves
serious concern. ‘It may so happen that the Planning Commission
or even the Finance Commission (or possibly a central ministry)
may reward a rich State with a poor tax effort as against a relatively
poor State with a good track record in mobilising tax revenues’
(Oommen, 1987). Therefore, before effecting any resource
transfers, the Union government must evaluate about the impact of
such transfers on the tax efforts of the States. Studies (M.
Naganathan (1994), Bajaj, Sinha and Agarwal (1985),
Ansari(1983))  shows that the interstate imbalances have over the
years widened instead of narrowing down, although the backward
States have not lagged behind the centre or more developed States
in tax efforts.  Therefore empirical evidences and analysis on these
lines may throw new insights on this problem and could provide the
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form in which the future resource transfer policy of Union government
should be in order to stimulate tax efforts or at least not to encourage
laxity in the   tax  efforts  of  the  States.    In this context an attempt
is made to evaluate the effect ofUnion resource transfer policies
on the tax effort of the States. This has to be done in the light of
literature in this area.
Scope and Limitations of the Study
To facilitate a medium term time series analysis, the choice
of the period covers fifteen years from 1970-71 to 1984-85 for which
comparable SDP data are available and it covers the transfers,
made by three Finance Commissions (from 1969-70 to 1983-84).
The choice of the States are also restricted to fourteen (Punjab,
Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal,
Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat and Haryana) for the sake of comparability.
The basic limitation of the present study is that it does not
focus on the total Union-State resource transfers both on revenue
and capital account by all Union Government agencies like Planning
Commission, Union ministries etc. The present study deals only
with the Finance Commission transfers. Another limitation is that
the study concentrates only on the revenue side of the State finance.
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Effects of Federal Grants on the Budgets of Receipient
Government
The classification of grants by E.Gramlich6 is followed here
for the sack of simplicity. He classified them in terms of open ended
matching grant(A), unconditional grant(B) and closed-ended
categorical grant(C). Open ended matching grant is theoretically
assumed to alter the relative prices facing lower levels of
government. (Thurow, 1966; Break, 1980). This price effect or the
response of expenditures by lower level government in turn depends
on the price elasticity of the demand for the aided good. These
grants are most useful for correcting inefficiencies in the provision
of those public goods that cause benefit spillovers. (Break, 1980;
Breton, 1965).
The second type that is the unconditional grants are assumed
to modify only the income available to the receipient government
budget and not the relative prices facing them. Unconditional grants
do not stimulate local expenditure because it need not be spent on
for a particular function and it does not change the relative prices
of any services. Thus they exert income effect and may induce the
receipient government to reduce its own revenue raising activities.
This type of transfers, mainly addressed to meet the vertical fiscal
imbalance, safeguard the ‘autonomy’ of the unit government to some
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extent and the unit government also prefers this type of transfers. In
most of the developing countries unconditional grants or revenue
sharing are often used to address multiple objectives namely
equalisation, vertical fiscal imbalance, regional development etc.
(Revenue sharing is treated here as unconditional grant due to reasons
mentioned earlier).
However, one of the serious limitations of this grant is the
fact that the grantor government bears the burden of imposing the
taxes, while the receipient government decides how to utilise the
money. This ‘asymmetry’ between the political ‘unpopularity’ of
imposing taxes and the political ‘popularity’ of spending money is
said to foster fiscal irresponsibility7. These grants, therefore, may
not encourage the unit government to gather their own resources
nor raise the standard of performance and may be used by them to
reduce their own revenue raising efforts.8
Gramlich and Galpar (1973) calls the third type - closed-
ended categorical grants-as a hybrid of the above two types in that
the central government lower the price of aided services but limit
the size of the grant. These grants are expected to effect both the
relative prices and incomes facing the lower levels of government.
These grants ‘preserves local control over the relevant functional
260
category of expenditures but yet allows the central government to
upgrade local spending. It doesn’t, however, allow the local
government as much freedom as it would have with an open-ended
price reduction grant: the central government maintain control over
its own budget by limiting the total amount of funds available to
lower governments’9. Thus the main disadvantage of this grant is
that local priorities are distorted and the autonomy of the local
government are eroded to some extent.
Empirical Studies
             Empirical studies on the budgetary effects of federal
grants are numerous particularly with regard to the US and they
are familiarly known as ‘determinant studies’10. These studies make
an attempt to establish statistically the extent to which receipient
governments expenditures are ‘determined’ by  various  factors,
such  as federal grants, income, population, etc. Most of these
studies conducted during the sixties produced estimates that
federal grants result in substantially larger increase in State and
local expenditures than predicted by economic theory. Gramlich
argues that this approach failed to provide reliable results.
However, the latter empirical studies11 are more vigorous
than these determinant studies. Most of these studies, especially
in US, mostly confirms the theoretical hypothesis that closed  ended
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categorical grants are more stimulative12 than open ended matching
grant and that both have larger expenditure effects than the general
unconditional grants and  revenue sharing. The well known study
by Gramlich and Galpar (1973) estimates that State and local
expenditures increase by $0.25 to $0.43 for each dollar of
unconditional (general purpose) fiscal assistance which means that
the remaining grant amount is used to provide tax relief and/or to
lower service charges below what they would otherwise have been.
Another study13 conclude that the insignificant stimulative impact
of federal revenue sharing implies that cities tend to use revenue
sharing grants to lower their tax burdens not to increase their service
levels.
Empirical Studies in India
             Most of the studies conducted in foreign countries
are of ‘expenditure determinant’ types as mentioned earlier and
most of them have not examined the incentive effects on    tax  effort
of  the recipient government  consequent upon the transfer of federal
grants. To test the fiscal irresponsibility hypothesis it is necessary
to examine the tax effort implications of the grant policy during a
period besides examining the expenditure behavior in response
to this policies14. Thus the fiscal impact of grant transfer has two
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dimensions - revenue and expenditure and may cause variation
both in tax efforts and expenditure decisions. However, the present
study is not going to test the fiscal irresponsibility hypothesis as
such rather it is an attempt to estimate exclusively the tax effort
implications consequent upon the federal transfers in order to keep
the study manageable and specific.
In India, D.T. Lakdawala (1967), A. Chanda (1965) and
R.N.Bhargava (1974) first identified the issue of incentive effect.
Having emphasised the significance of tax effort in the distribution
of Union transfers K.N. Reddy (1975), R.J. Chelliah and N.Sinha
(1982),  G. Thimmaiah15 (1979),M.A. Oommen (1987) and J.V.M.
Sarma (1989) have attempted only to measure a reliable indicator
for relative tax efforts of the States.   An empirical study        by  R.W.
Bahl and V. Pillai being first of its nature rejected the fiscal
irresponsibility hypothesis through a cross section model for 17
Indian States. However, the validity of this model to test fiscal
irresponsibility hypothesis and the inference arrived was questioned
on various grounds by M.G. Rao (1977), NIPFP (1981) and G.
Thimmaiah (1981).   Hemlata Rao (1981) used different analytical
technique. Transfers of Finance Commission and Planning
Commission were analysed by the multiple regression models. She
concluded that both of them miserably failed to achieve their
objective of augmenting State resources in an equitable manner.
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But basically the study examined only the influence of tax
effort on the resource distribution and not the impact of Union
transfers on the tax effort of the States.
The impact of Union resource transfers on tax effort was
specifically examined for the first time by a study team from NIPFP
(1981) under the leadership of R. J. Chelliah. This study taken into
account 15 major States for the period from 1965-66 to 1974-75.
Keeping PCSDP, average per capita federal transfer and Finance
Commission transfer as a percentage of total federal transfers as
explanatory variables and tax-income ratio as the dependent
variable by using pooled cross section data the study concluded
that ‘federal transfer as a whole seem to be having a dampening
effect on the tax efforts of the States, though the effect may not be
specifically attributed to the policies proposed by the Finance
Commission”. Further “it is also not possible to assert that the latter
have stimulated tax effort”. This lack of authenticity and clarity with
regard to Finance Commission transfers might be due to the use
of aggregate method in which all States were taken together without
accounting for the individual State effects. Further, keeping total
federal transfers as one variable, the study used the percentage of
Finance Commission transfer that is part of former, as another
explanatory variable and this may result in the problem of ‘multi-
collinearity’. Lastly, NIPFP study used cross section data; but one
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of the major problem faced by the empirical studies16 measuring
the impact of federal grants is the question of whether or not time
series or cross section data should be used17. To overcome this
controversy and to get a comparative pictures the present study
use both time series and cross-section data.
G.Thimmaiah (1980) and Ranjana (1984) made other
attempts. Although these two studies have disaggregated the
transfers they have not accounted for the inter temporal effect and
the individual characteristics of different States which are of course
heterogeneous in nature and may distort the results. Thus the
following issues were identified from the above review. i)
Considerable number of studies was conducted in foreign
countries. ii) Some of the studies conducted in India have not
focused their attention exclusively on the impact of Union transfers
on the tax efforts of the States. iii) Some of the studies that examined
the tax effort implications suffers from the aggregation bias and
the econometric technique used by them are questionable one.
Lastly there was no state-wise study to examine the variations in
the relative tax effort of the States.
With this background the present study examines empirically
the effect of Union transfers especially Finance Commission transfer
on the revenue effort of the States both in a cross section and time
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series framework. The revenue effort is a broader indicator than
the tax effort because it includes non-tax, non-loan revenue of the
State that are mainly from the service charges of State level public
sector enterprises (SLPE). This SLPE charges/prices are treated
here as tax revenue.
Data and its Limitation
Most of the data regarding the States’ own tax revenue, non-
tax, non-loan revenue, Finance Commission  transfers,18  plan-
grants19  and non-plan grants20 on revenue account are obtained
from the various issues of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Bulletin.
This Bulletin has been presenting an article on State finance right
from its fourth volume in which a detailed state-wise data base is
presented every year. To make them comparable RBI makes some
adjustments21.
The RBI Bulletin followed old series up to 1966-67 and new
series with modified classification since 1967-6822. Therefore no
serious analysis can be attempted for the period preceding 1967-
68 by using RBI data. The immediate next year 1968-69 is also
avoided to make the first year of the study 1969-70 coincides with
the beginning of Fifth Finance Commission and Fourth Plan23. In
this case also the break-ups are not available for plan transfers up
to 1972-73 and these figures have been splitted by making
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The RBI Bulletin followed old series up to 1966-67 and new
series with modified classification since 1967-6822. Therefore no
serious analysis can be attempted for the period preceding 1967-
68 by using RBI data. The immediate next year 1968-69 is also
avoided to make the first year of the study 1969-70 coincides with
the beginning of Fifth Finance Commission and Fourth Plan23. In
this case also the break-ups are not available for plan transfers up
to 1972-73 and these figures have been splitted by making
necessary adjustments. The data for per capita State domestic
product are taken from the ‘Estimates of State Domestic product,
1970-71 to 1985-86’ published by Central Statistical Organisation
and mid year population figures are also computed from the same.
The CSO has computed comparable SDP data (Though
not in the strictest sense) by income originating method. Though it
is felt that the income accruing method is the ‘first best’, absence
of any other alternative forced to use the available ‘second best’.
This is one of the serious limitations in this area.
Methodology
Revenue income ratio (RIR) is used as a proxy for the
dependent variable tax effort. It is explained by using Union transfers
namely per capita Finance Commission transfers (PFC), per capita
plan grants (PPG), per capita non-plan grants (PNPG) and per
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capita State domestic product (PCSDP). The first three explanatory
variables represent discretionary changes influencing revenue -
income ratio and the PCSDP variable represents the automatic
changes or the taxable capacity factors influencing RIR. The
discretionary changes are brought about by the States in response
to Union transfers such as Finance Commission transfers, plan
and non-plan grants which are used as explanatory variables.
Among these transfers Finance Commission transfers constitute
a major influence because these transfers are ‘preset’ and hence
assured. All these transfers are represented by lagged values with
one year lag because it is not the current year transfers that should
be considered for the purpose of explanation; the transfers made
during the previous year are the relevant ones. The data consists
of observations on the five variables mentioned above for fourteen
major States over a period of fifteen years.
The following five models were formulated for the purpose
of explaining the relationship under consideration keeping in view
certain purposes as described below.
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Where y represents RIR, X represents an explanatory
variable, D represents dummy variable, u and e represents
disturbance terms and a, b and g represents parameters of the
model.
Model I makes use of the entire set of data for estimating
the regression of RIR on PCSDP, PFC, PPG and PNPG.
Model II considers the relationship giving explicit
representation for inter-state differences in the intercept parameter
with the help of thirteen (14-1) dummy variables.
Model III considers the relationship giving explicit
representation for inter temporal differences in the intercept
parameter with the help of fourteen (15-1) dummy variables.
Model IV gives the relationship for each and every State and
it is estimated with the time series data for respective States.
Model V gives the relationship for each and every year and
it is estimated with the cross section data for fourteen States.
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Results
The estimated co-efficients for PFC is significantly negative at
five per cent level and the estimate for PCSDP is significantly positive
at the same level of significance. The estimated co-efficients for PNPG
is negative and significant at ten per cent level. (Table 2). When model
I is modified into model II by incorporating dummy variables for different
States the estimates are significant for most of the parameters. (Table
3) However this model can’t represent the overall national phenomenon
as it is separating the intercept terms for different States. Hence the
positive sign for the estimate of the parameter for PFC need not be
taken seriously as indicating the overall national scene.
The estimated co-efficients for PFC is significantly negative at
five per cent level and the estimate for PCSDP is significantly positive
at the same level of significance. The estimated co-efficients for PNPG
is negative and significant at ten per cent level. (Table 2). When model
I is modified into model II by incorporating dummy variables for different
States the estimates are significant for most of the parameters. (Table
3) However this model can’t represent the overall national phenomenon
as it is separating the intercept terms for different States.
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Table 1Regression Analysis of the Effect of Union Resource
Transfers on the Tax Efforts (RIR) of the States (1969-1984)
Explanatory                         Rregression
variables                            co-efficient                           t- Statistic
Perrcapita State
Domestic Product                 .001692                               6.249
Percapita Finance
Commission Transfers         .017350                               1.234
Percapita Plan Grant              .008354                             0.333
Percapita Non plan Grant     - .075546          -2.810
Constant                        6.530560                         18.046
Number of Observations                                            210
F(4,205)            24.88
Adjusted R2          . 3137
Root MSE          .1095
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Table 2 Regression Analysis of the Effect of
Union Resource Transfers on the Tax Efforts (RIR) of the
States  (With time dummies)
Explanatory   Regression t-statistic
Variables Coefficient
Percapita SDP .000921 2.490
Percapita FC Transfers -.054166 -2.055
Percapita Plan Grant -.009322 -0.316
Percapita Nonplan Grant     -.048421 -1.753
Time Dummy
  1970-71                                 .322430                               0.419
1971-72                            1.753524 2.247
1972-73                              .871184 1.083
1973-74                            1.56034 1.901
1974-75                             3.024591 3.457
1975-76                             3.733932 3.859
1976-77                            3.219795 3.268
1977-78                            4.041187 3.745
1978-79                            4.407508 3.731
1979-80                            5.014967 3.388
1980-81                            5.718427 3.462
1981-82                            6.036840 3.359
1982-83                           5.947073 3.070
1983-84                           6.357387 2.933
Constant                          6.985892 9.076
Number of Observations 210
F(4,205) 7.64
Adjusted R2 .3638
Root MSE 2.031
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Table 3 Regression Analysis of the Effect of
Union Resource Transfers on the Tax Efforts (RIR) of the
 States (With State dummies)
Explanatory   Regression t-statistic
Variables Coefficient
Percapita SDP .000126 .415
Percapita FC Transfers .065215 6.139
Percapita Plan Grant 001797 .124
Percapita Nonplan Grant    -.035905                           -2.396
State Dummy
Karnataka                      2.427633                               5.978
Kerala                               .895749                               2.184
West Bengal                 -3.285750 -7.956
Tamil Nadu                     1.804536 4.465
Maharashtra                  1.254788 2.740
Gujarat                             .552003 1.259
Hariyana                        1.916260 3.879
Punjab                              .046873 0.083
Bihar                              -3.852365 -9.214
Madya Predesh               .510551 1.262
Orissa                           -3.065530 -6.848
Uttara Predesh            -2.651372 -6.580
Rajasthan                     -1.182327 -2.908
Constant                        7.077414 21.389
Number of Observations 210
F(4,205) 54.74
Adjusted R2 .8138
Root MSE 1.0987
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 Hence the positive sign for the estimate of the parameter for PFC
need not be taken seriously as indicating the overall national scene.
The estimate of model IV representing the relation for every
State gives insignificant results for almost all the States taken
individually.
The estimation of model V representing relation for every
year, estimated with cross section data for the States, yield uniformly
insignificant results for all the years.
Based on the above econometric investigation involving a
variety of formulations of the relationship under consideration it is
concluded that model III which is estimated with the entire data
(pooled data) gives most satisfactory estimation and explanation
of the relationship under investigation.
It may be concluded that the co-efficient of PFC (.054) is
significantly negative and that PCSDP is significantly positive for
the over all situation in the country. Of the other two transfers the
parameter for PPG, though negative turned out to be insignificant
while the parameter for PNPG is negative and significant at ten
percent level.
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 Thus it is clear from the above that the Finance Commission
transfers have discouraged the revenue efforts of the states.
However, the existence of negative implication  in itself may not be
a cause for concern if there exists an efficient and equitable
mechanism of intergovernmental transfers strongly linked to
revenue/tax effort criterion to encourage the revenue mobilisation
efforts of the states. The Eleventh Finance Commission should
come out with some bold corrective measures, particularly by
assigning considerable weightage for revenue effort factor in its
devolution formula.
Notes and References
1.      See Anwar Shah (1994).
2.       This is also the case of most developing countries.
3.       Finance commission is a semi-judicial body under Article
280 of the Indian constitution to be appointed by the President
in every five years. The commission is charged with the
responsibility of recommending i) on the distribution between
the Union and the States, and between the sates, of sharable
taxes under Article 270 (income taxes other than corporation
taxes). ii) to recommend grants-in-aid to States which may
be ‘in need of assistance’ under Article 275 and iii) ‘any other
matters’ which may be referred to the commission by the
president ‘in the interest of sound finance’.
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4. Though there is no constitutional provision the Planning
Commission, a non-statutory body is established by the
Union government through a resolution dated March 15, 1950.
Article 282 is meant for giving grants for ‘any public
purposes’. This Article has been used by the Planning
Commission to make huge amount of discretionary transfers.
5. Non-plan discretionary transfers made by different Union
government ministries and agencies for some general as
well as specific purposes come under this catagory.   These
include transfers to meet relief and natural calamities,
institutional finances from LIC, GIC, UTI etc., loans from small
savings collection, schematic transfers from Union ministries
and other miscellaneous loans and grants.
6. E. Gramlich (1969), (1977) and with H. Galper (1973).
7. B.R. Herber (1988).
8. Musgrave (1961).
9. Gramlich (1977).
10. For a detailed account of these studies see E. Gramlich
(1969).
11. Gramlich and Galper (1973); Gramlich (1977).
12. A grant is characterised as being ‘stimulative’ if expenditures
on the State and local service receiving the aid increase by
an amount larger than the grant, i.e., if the grant impact
exceeds Rs.1.00.
13. H.F. Ladd et. al. (1985).
14. M.G. Rao (1977).
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15. This study has taken into account only four Southern States.
16. Gramlich (1969); Auld (1976).
17. The cross-section response refers to the average provincial
governments response to changes in those variables under
consideration, where in the time series, it is the response of
the sum total of all those units in the sample.
18. Finance Commission transfer is the sum total of shared taxes
and statutory grants.
19. Plan grants are the sum total of transfers made to meet the
State Plan Schemes, Central Plan Schemes and centrally
sponsored schemes.
20. The departmental transfers excluding Finance Commission
and Planning Commission transfers.
21. The other sources of data are ‘Combined Finance and
Revenue Accounts of the Central and State Governments’ in
India and conspectus of the budgets of the Central, State
and Union Territory Governments both published by the
Ministry of Finance, Government of India. However these
sources suffers from certain limitations like comparability,
absence of necessary adjustment for economic analysis etc.
22. Starting with its volume 23, year 1969.
23. There was no objective criteria to determine the allocation of
plan assistance before 1969-70. Since 1969-70 the shareof
each State is determined on the basis of a rational objective
formula (called familiarly as Gadgil formula).
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